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In the long run context of dramatically rising inequalities in income and wealth, the 
financial crisis and ensuing ‘Great Recession’ pose a dual challenge to egalitarian policy.  
Low growth and fiscal constraints provide technocratic constraints on feasible policies, as 
well as looming large in the ideational spaces occupied by policy-makers. But more subtly, 
hard economic times may provide political challenges for egalitarian policies if they 
undermine trust in government intervention, or promote a ‘hunkering down’ in policy 
mood (J. Alt, Preston, & Sibieta, 2010; J. E. Alt, 1979). This paper examines public 
attitudes, focusing on two particular tools for shaping the distribution of income: the size 
of government and the progressivity of its tax structures. The news on the former is bad, 
for egalitarians. But in both public opinion and in economic reality, I argue that progressive 
tax structures provide a feasible policy response to inequality in hard times. Further, the 
importance of progressivity in combating inequality is not in its redistributive role, but its 
pre-distributive one. That is, the confiscatory element of progressive taxation does not 
yield high enough revenues to effect much fiscal redistribution. But in contributing to the 
shape of market income inequality, progressive taxation constitutes an important pre-
distributive policy tool. 
 
Public opinion appears to have hardened against egalitarian policy following the financial 
crisis. This is certainly true with regard to the size of government spending and the overall 
level of taxation. However, this does not imply a retreat from redistribution with regard to 
the structure of taxation (and possibly spending). In general, attitudes towards 
progressivity are both different and more favourable than those towards large 
government. But can progressive taxes actually achieve meaningful egalitarian progress? 
There is some truth in the argument that progressive tax structures do not do much to 
reduce inequality.   However, evidence on this score considers only the mechanical effects 
of taxation on the difference between market and disposable income inequality; where in 
fact the larger effect may be on the pre-fisc distribution of income itself. 
 
First, I present the results from some work in progress on the impact of the crisis on 
public attitudes to state intervention in Britain. In the context of hard times, public 
attitudes militate against high levels of taxation and spending, beyond any economic 
constraints. However, and second, there are important differences between public 
attitudes towards the overall size of government, and the shape it takes in terms of 
targeting different income groups. How does the public assess progressive tax structures? 
By `progressive' we denote tax structures in which the share of income contributed to the 
state is an increasing fraction of income, as income increases. I present data from the UK 
that reflects my previous findings that progressivity is viewed more favourably than large 
government. Third, I show that if anything, support for progressivity has increased in the 
context of the Great Recession. These findings on progressivity paint a more optimistic 
picture for egalitarian policy. 
 
But does this leave us with the dilemma of having effective tools for redistribution (high 
levels of taxation and spending) that receive little public support, and ineffective tools 
(progressive tax structures) that are popular? In the final section I argue that this is not 
the case, based on the impact of progressive taxation on the distribution of incomes 
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before government intervention. Recent economic research indicates not only that the 
progressivity of (income) taxation reduces income inequality,  but also that this comes 
essentially at the  expense of bargaining rents for top managers rather than productive  
activity. Public reactions to this kind of tax policy are less well explored, but the data that 
do exist seem to point in a favourable direction. 
 
Preferences over the size of the government budget in hard times 
 
Support for redistributive policies declined precipitously with the financial crisis and 
subsequent recession after 2007. Some have argued that the financial crisis discredited 
Labour’s economic policies, as they came to be seen as incompetent by virtue of presiding 
over crisis. However, in recent research with Timothy Hicks, I have found that a large part 
of the turn away from redistributive policies can be accounted for by the material interests 
of voters as aggregate economic conditions changed. 
 
 
Figure 1:  The effect of aggregate income changes on preferences for 
government intervention 
 
Source: British Election Study (2010); Barnes & Hicks (2014). 
Figure 1 shows the impact of the recession in raw data from the British Election Study that 
asks respondents whether the government should spend more on health and social 
services, increasing taxation, or should cut taxes, spending less on health and social 
services. The clear drop in the recession is partly recovered in 2009 and 2010, but 
attitudes towards government intervention are much more wary in hard times. 
 
This seems to suggest a new ‘Robin Hood paradox:’ that when Robin Hood is most needed 
to redistribute from rich to poor, he is least likely to gain support. It seems this may be 
true not only in times of high inequality (as originally formulated), but also in times of high 
unemployment and low growth. Recessions look bad for egalitarian policymaking. 
 
The size versus the shape of government 
However, the size of government taxes and spending are not the only policy dimension 
that governments might vary according to their preferences over equality. The structure of 
taxation – its overall progressivity in particular – and the way that publicly financed 
benefits are distributed will also affect post-disc outcomes. This is true in the pre-crisis 
period, but importantly, when not only public opinion but also economic circumstance 
militate against high levels of spending, redistribution via the shape of government 
remains popular.1  In recent work, I find that across the advanced industrial countries, the 
modal attitude towards taxation is one of resistance to higher levels but support for higher 
progressivity (Barnes, 2014). 
This general finding is replicated in the UK and illustrated in Figure 2. First, in the middle 
column we see an immediate discrepancy between views on taxes overall and taxes on the 
rich. Compared to the original 60%, only 25% of respondents think that taxes on the rich 
are too high. A plurality, 37%, think that taxes on the rich are about right. However, this 
acceptance of taxes paid by the rich hides a much higher demand for relative progressivity 
in tax policy changes. That is, most of those who think the rich pay about the right 
amount in taxes think that low and middle income groups pay too much. The final column 
of the figure takes this into account in creating a variable that captures whether the 
profile of responses that an individual makes when responding about the level of tax paid 
across income groups is progressive. For example, if we ask about taxes on high, middle 
and low incomes, and the response is that they are ‘too low; about  right;  too high,’ this 
constitutes  a progressive profile, as does ‘about right, too high, too high.’ In contrast, 
saying that taxes on all groups are too low – or more realistically, too high – is not a 
progressive profile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Attitudes towards the structure of taxation in the UK, 2006 
 
Note: Progressive type compares the attitude towards tax on the rich with the 
                                               
1  In what  follows I focus primarily  on the  tax  side of the  budget,  but  it is worth  noting  that the  so-called  
‘paradox  of redistribution’ on the  spending  side – where  more  targeted programs undermine  redistribution due to 
their  lack of popular  support – appears  to have been historically limited to the pre-1990 era (Kenworthy, 2011; 
Marx,  Salanauskaite, & Verbist,  2013). 
respondent’s attitude to taxes on other income levels. 48% of respondents overall, or 55% 
of those with substantive responses, have response profiles indicating preferences for 
relatively higher taxes on those with high incomes than those with middle and low 
incomes.  
Source: ISSP Research Group (2006). 
 
Under these definitions, support for progressive taxation stood at a majority 55% in the 
UK in 2006. Thus, even before the crisis drop in support for large government, changes to 
the structure of taxation were already a more favoured type of redistributive change. 
 
Support for progressivity in hard times 
 
Just as we saw change in support for large government in response to the economic crisis, 
though, we might expect to see changes in attitudes towards progressivity. In fact we do, 
but these changes are in the opposite direction as far as taxes on the rich are considered.  
Further, progressive tax policies remain popular when made as concrete policy proposals 
with real income brackets specified, such that not all of the support for progressive 
policies relies on misconceptions about what counts as ‘high income.’ 
 
Figure 3 replicates the results for attitudes on taxing the rich from the 2006 ISSP, and 
compares them to a similar question asked by YouGov in 2012. The questions are not 
identical, as the ISSP asks about taxes on ‘those with high incomes’, while the YouGov poll 
asks about ‘the richest people in Britain.’  Thus, the implicitly higher incomes of ‘the 
richest’ rather than merely ‘high’ incomes may explain some of the discrepancy. 
  
Nevertheless, it is certainly not the case that support for progressive taxes on the rich 
declined with the crisis in the same way as support for tax and spending levels. 
 
Progressive tax policies also remain popular in more concrete terms, rather than the 
abstract notion of ‘taxes on the rich’.  Over the past four years, the introduction, 
elimination and re-proposal of the 50p rate for the highest income tax bracket has kept a 
concrete, progressive reform on the political agenda. In April 2009, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Alistair Darling announced an increase in the top rate of tax to be paid by very 
high income earners: above a £150,000 threshold, income would be taxed at a rate of 50 
per cent.  This additional rate compares to the previous top rate of 40 per cent, which in 
2010 (when the 50p rate was introduced) applied to incomes above £37,400.  After the 
election of the coalition, the 2012 budget announced the reduction of the additional rate 
to 45p. The 50p top rate made headlines, if not a reality, again in January 2014 when the 
shadow Chancellor promised that a Labour government would restore the higher top rate. 
 
Figure 3:  Attitudes towards the level of taxes paid by those with high incomes 
before and after the financial crisis 
 
Note:  The share of respondents thinking that the rich pay too little in tax increased to 
55% in 2012.  
Source: YouGov (2012), ISSP Research Group (2006). 
 
As well as ensuring that the question of progressivity remained in the public eye – and in 
pollsters’ surveys – this history provides some useful background variation against which 
to gauge support for progressive taxation. First, over the full period it is symmetrical in 
including both tax increases (the 2009 change and 2014 proposal) and a tax cut (in 2012). 
There are two reasons why this might be important. First, having policy proposals on both 
the introduction and elimination of the 50p rate means that we should be able to identify if 
blanket support for generic ‘tax cuts’ or increases drives opinion.  In this case, we would 
see lower support for the progressive rate in response to Osborne’s 2012 budget.  
Alternatively, the policy status quo may have an impact on preferences.  The 2009 
introduction of a new tax rate might be expected to provoke more resistance on the 
grounds of novelty (Daunton, 2001, p. 15; Rose & Karran, 1987). This would drive our 
expectations in the opposite direction: once the tax is in place it would be more popular.  
However, the lifetime of the 50p tax may have been too short to generate any real path 
dependence of this sort. 
  
 
Figure 4: Support for the introduction, opposition to the elimination, and 
support for the opposition proposal, of the 50p tax rate on incomes above 
£150,000 
 
Note: The grey shaded area represents uncertainty around the estimates, denoting 95% 
confidence intervals for the estimated proportions. Since 2009, support for the policy has 
remained high and effectively unchanged, with a majority of voters in favour. Note that 
this  is true  despite  the  different  status  of the  tax  in relation to the  status  quo 
during  this  period.   
Source:  YouGov (2014), Survation (2014), Populus (2009), YouGov (2012). 
 
Second, asking about a concrete tax change also mitigates concerns that everyone is in 
favour of taxes on ‘the rich,’ as long as that group is defined as those with higher incomes 
than themselves.  By explicitly stating the cut-off of £150,000, the concrete policy question 
avoids this. It is worth noting that this  threshold  is very high in the context  of the UK 
income distribution: for an individual without children this amount of income is well within 
the top 1% of the distribution in 2013. As such, most people will not be personally 
affected by the additional rate. The constant bracket in a period of moderate inflation (an 
average of just over 3% in the five years from 2009 to 2014) means that the number 
affected may have increased somewhat since the initial introduction of the top rate, but it 
is still a tiny share of the population who are counted as ‘rich.’ 
Figure 4 shows support for the 50p rate in four polls taken over the five years between 
April 2009 and January 2014 (the precise question wording in each case is given in the 
Appendix),  and coinciding with the events in the history of the 50p rate outlined above.  
The drawback of these questions is that none of them precede the financial crisis, thus 
they give us no leverage on whether hard times increase support for progressive taxes; 
but what they do show is consistently strong support for the 50p top rate over the crisis 
period. 
Although the sample sizes in each poll are not so large as to give extremely precise 
estimates of the proportion supporting progressive taxation, in every poll the 50p top rate 
easily receives majority support – from around 55 to 60% of respondents.  The estimates 
are not really precise enough to rule out that this support is entirely constant across the 
period; but to the extent that the minor variation estimated is systematic, it is at least 
consistent with expectations in the sense that support for the 50p rate is lowest when the 
proposal is to eliminate the top rate in 2012.  That is, a bias in favour of tax cuts could 
explain the dip in support to the extent that it is not simply sampling variability. 
 
Thus, it is not only in the abstract that progressive tax policies receive popular support. 
Even (or perhaps especially) in economic hard times, disproportionate taxes on the rich 
garner broad approval from voters. The contrast with general resistance to high rates of 
taxation and high levels of government activity overall is pronounced. It is also important if 
both the size and the structure of the government budget can be used as tools to achieve 
distributional goals. Whether progressive tax policy can play such a role is the subject of 
the next section. 
 
Progressive taxes as egalitarian policy 
 
Public support for progressive taxation is all very well, but the scholarly consensus is that 
progressive structures generally do not do that much to reduce inequality (Prasad & Deng, 
2009; Cusack & Beramendi, 2006; Kato, 2003; Ganghof, 2006). The amount of 
redistribution that governments do depends more on the overall size of government-- 
raising lots of tax revenue-- than the details of the tax structure. There are two related 
reasons for this: first, actually existing tax structures overall are simply not very 
progressive. Although marginal rates within the income tax are progressive, the 
distribution of the tax bases across income groups undermines this effect.  Second, even 
proportional taxes can do a lot of redistribution as long as the goods they fund are 
distributed more equally than the initial distribution of income.  In the case of many 
(most) government services, even with a slightly regressive structure in their uptake the 
distributive ‘gap’ between outlays and (proportional) taxation is much larger than the gap 
between slightly progressive and proportional  systems. 
 
Progressive taxes as pre-distributive policy 
  
However, redistribution in the instantaneous distribution of income – the measured 
difference between market and disposable incomes – is not the only way in which 
progressive tax policies affect inequality.  In fact, there are a number of good reasons to 
think that highly progressive income taxation will reduce inequality in market incomes 
themselves.  Since higher tax rates tend to reduce the size of the base they are levied on, 
more strongly increasing rates should reduce the difference between higher and lower 
incomes. This argument might be used on both sides of debates about progressivity.  
Lower pre-fisc inequality as the result of more progressive taxation points to behavioural 
responses to the tax code which might undermine economic growth (to the extent that 
they suppress valuable productive activity). Even if falling incomes at the top only 
undermine rent-shifting activities (Alvaredo,  Atkinson,  Piketty, & Saez, 2013), they will 
nevertheless  reduce government revenues to the extent that they are successful in 
diminishing top incomes. 
I follow Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) in outlining three behavioural mechanisms 
underlying an expectation that high marginal tax rates should reduce pre-fisc inequality. 
The first mechanism – and one which is commonly used as an argument against strongly 
progressive taxation – is that high taxes disincentivise effort. Since expending effort on 
productive activities (which generate income) is costly, reducing the returns to that effort 
by taxing them more strongly will cause individuals to substitute out of productive 
activities, and into leisure, at the margin.2 
 
                                               
2  There is also likely to be an income effect whereby higher taxes would induce greater effort, but we ignore this for 
now. 
The second possibility, which also tends to weigh against high marginal rates, is that more 
onerous taxation may lead to more active tax avoidance.  The underlying economic activity  
may be exactly the same, but  by taking remuneration in fringe benefits, by pursuing 
business forms that are advantageous only for tax purposes, and so on, reported  income 
may decline with high rates. This mechanism points primarily to the futility of high tax 
rates – any observed reduction in inequality is a statistical artefact rather than a true 
effect. It also points to some ‘real’ effects to the extent that energies are wasted avoiding 
taxation which could be more fruitfully targeted elsewhere. 
 
Finally,  high top marginal tax rates may reduce the incentives to economically inefficient 
abuses of managerial power in the form of rent-seeking.  To the degree that managerial 
compensation is the outcome of wasteful bargaining efforts rather than objective 
performance, then high taxes on the returns of this activity generates have a positive, 
corrective effect. 
 
Beyond a focus on purely individual incentives, progressive taxation may affect the pre-fisc 
distribution of incomes indirectly via its influence on norms of equality and fair pay. XXX 
Frydman, C & Molloy, R. S. (2011) Western & Rosenfeld (2011) Levy & Temin (2007) 
Piketty Saez (2003) XXX Progressive taxation -> social norms that financial benefits not 
necessarily merited by success/success not measured by financial returns -> income 
inequality reductions as incentives to earn huge incomes are reduced even without 
reducing the incentives for professional success (rewarded in other ways(?)).  
 
The first empirical question, then, is whether higher marginal tax rates do in fact lead to 
lower levels of inequality.  Figure 5 shows the association between the income share of the  
top 1% of taxpayers and the marginal tax rates paid by those with incomes equal to five 
times GDP per capita, an income level approximately equal to the 99th income percentile. 
This is a better measure than just a top marginal rate as it keeps constant the number of 
people who will be affected by the rate in question.  Panel (b) shows the relationship 
between the two variables once the independent effects of country, year, GDP, population 
and their interaction have been averaged out via regression analysis. 
 
Figure 5:  The relationship between progressive taxation and pre-fisc inequality 
 
Source: Calculations based on Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström (2009). 
 
The results are clear: higher marginal tax rates do seem to be associated with lower levels 
of inequality (as measured by the top 1% share).  Although these effects cannot strictly 
be thought of as causal, most confounding factors will be accounted for via the country 
and year fixed effects. They also replicate the findings of Roine, Vlachos, and 
Waldenström (2009), who consider a broader range of potential confounders and also use 
some alternative strategies to make a causal interpretation more credible. 
 
The impact of progressive taxation on inequality may operate less through the mechanical 
impact of the tax structure on fiscal redistribution, and more through its pre-distributive 
effects. Just as other contributions to this volume emphasise the importance of 
government policy in raising incomes at the lower end of the distribution (Lynch & Bruno 
Palier; Busemeyer; Baziller; all this volume), progressive taxation may be one of the few 
tools available to governments seeking to rein in inequality at the top. This is not achieved 
by confiscation per se, but by changing the incentives to accumulate huge market 
incomes.  
 
In this context we may be concerned by the potential impact of high top tax rates on  
economic growth. If the effect of highly progressive taxation on incentives to earn high 
incomes operates through the first channel identified by Piketty et al. (2014), progressivity 
may have an adverse effect on growth. This relationship, in figures analogous to those 
above for inequality, are shown in Figure 6.  Here, there is no evidence in the data that 
high tax rates undermine economic performance.  This is also consistent with recent work 
by IMF economists who find no evidence that redistribution is harmful to growth, unlike 
inequality itself (Ostry & and Charalambos G. Tsangarides, 2013). 
 
How are these ideas reflected in public opinion?  Unfortunately, to my knowledge there are 
no sources of data that ask respondents explicitly about whether they would be prepared 
to trade off growth to see income more equally distributed. 
 
Figure 6: The non-relationship between progressive taxation and economic 
growth 
 
Source: Calculations based on Roine et al. (2009). 
 
On the other hand, the idea that highly progressive tax rates may not maximise tax 
revenues is one on which the British public are surprisingly sanguine.  In the same YouGov 
poll analysed above (YouGov, 2014), when faced with the question: 
 
“Imagine it was the case that a top tax rate of 50p did not bring in any extra money. 
Which of the following would best represent your view?” 
 
fully forty  per cent of respondents  thought that  “A 50p top tax rate should be introduced  
regardless of what it brings in - it is morally right that the rich should pay higher taxes,” as 
against only four percentage points more (44%) who thought that such a tax should not 
be levied. 
 
Progressivity, Revenues and the Pre-distribution Agenda 
 
The two preceding sections suggest that progressive taxation should be seen as a policy 
with which to regulate the supply side rather than a motor for revenue generation. In this 
sense taxation should be at the centre of pre-distributive as well as re-distributive 
government policy.  
 
However, taxation is the way in which countries raise revenues to pay for traditional 
redistribution as well as any spending on new social risks, or investments in education and 
skills. Thus taxation must play a dual role in the broader pre-distributive agenda.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
Progressive taxation thus fits the broader redistributive agenda in acting as a regulatory, 
as well as a revenue-raising tool. The ways in which private actors respond to the changed 
incentives and social norms that more progressive tax structures generate may have a 
more significant impact on inequality than their pure redistributive impact. These taxes 
which tend not to raise large amounts of revenue, in part because they apply only at very 
high levels of income. To the extent that these changed incentives have limited 
detrimental effects on growth, they should be considered positively.  
 
Moreover, the political popularity of progressive taxation cannot be gainsaid. In this 
chapter we have focused on the United Kingdom, but as Figure 2 in this chapter shows, 
general support for tax progressivity is replicated across the developed world. In this 
regard, progressive taxation may have a key place in the broader redistributive agenda. 
While education spending is generally popular as a priority within government spending 
categories (in 2013, 30 per cent of people advocated prioritising education (British Social 
Attitudes 2013)), the first section of this chapter showed that popular support for 
government spending in general may be closely constrained. Moreover, the specific 
predistributive policies most strongly advocated in this volume may be those which 
struggle to gain popular support: when choosing between recipients of social transfers, 
only 22 per cent of respondents favor increases for single parents and children combined-- 
compared to 48 per cent support for prioritising pensions. Within the education sector, the 
new is yet worse: only 3.7 per cent of respondents favor spending on students' further 
education-- the locus for vocational policies of the type advocated as a key driver of 
predistribution. Early years intervention fares somewhat better, but there is little evidence 
of any groundswell of support for this kind of predistributive programof the sort enjoyed 
by progressive taxation. 
 
The empirical evidence presented here supports the notion that tax policy in general – and 
progressive taxation in particular – is a tool that not only has strong popular support but 
also can have an important effect on the distribution of incomes.  Considering three 
arguments against this position with reference to the empirical record and the state-of-
the-art research, we  can reject the arguments (a) that progressive policy is unpopular; 
(b) that progressive taxation does little to help inequality; and (c) that to the extent that  
it helps combat inequality,  progressive taxation also undermines  growth. Tax policy could 
thus play an important role in a pre-distributive agenda oriented towards greater equality. 
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A     Survey Question Texts 
A.1  50p  Tax Rate 
Table 1:  Survey question texts and responses coded as support for progressive 
taxation for Figure 4 on the 50p top tax rate 
 
Date Firm N Question Responses coded 
as support for 50p 
rate 
Apr-09 Populus 518 I am going to read out some measures that 
were announced by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in this afternoon's budget 
statement. Please say in each case if you 
think it is a positive measure or a negative 
measure, or if you think that it won't have 
much effect either way, please say so. An 
increase from next year in the top rate of tax 
from 45% to 50% for those earning over 
£150000. 
Very positive, 
fairly positive (vs. 
no real effect, 
fairly negative, 
very negative). 
Mar-12 YouGov 1835 Do you support or oppose the following 
policies announced by the Chancellor: 
Cutting the top rate of income tax for people 
earning over £150000 from 50p to 45p 
Oppose (vs. 
support). 
Jan-14 YouGov 1381 Currently the top rate of income tax is 45p in 
the pound for earnings over £150000. Would 
you support or oppose increasing the top rate 
of income tax on earnings over £150000 to 
50p in the pound? 
Support (vs 
oppose). 
Jan-14 Survation 1045 Shadow Chancellor Ed Balls annnounced 
today that if Labour wins power it will raise 
the top rate of income tax from the current 
45p in the pound to 50p in the pound for 
those with earnings over £150000. To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with this 
policy? 
Agree strongly; 
agree somewhat 
(vs. neither agree 
nor disagree; 
disagree 
somewhat; 
disagree strongly).  
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